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Lawyers' Ethics: A Survey of the New York City Bar. By
Jerome E. Carlin. New York: Russell Sage Foundation,
1966. Pp. 267. $6.75.
The study of legal ethics involves a number of questions. What
should be the precepts of legal ethics? What are in fact the generally
accepted norms to which it is agreed that lawyers ought to conform?
For what sorts of reasons and by whom are such norms or precepts
broken? Professor Carlin,' bypassing the first question and relying on
the bar itself to answer the second, has produced a detailed study of
the third problem among lawyers in New York's First Judicial Depart-
ment.2 The bulk of his book is devoted to an analysis of some eight
hundred interviews with lawyers, and its central purpose is to discover
such correlations as there may be between the various types of practice
and the incidence of unethical legal behavior.
Although Carlin relies upon the Canons of Ethics for the definition
and limitation of his subject matter,3 his working definition of "ethi-
cal" is derived from six "lawyer-informants," each of whom was asked
to rate several of his colleagues as "ethical" or "unethical." Using the
lawyers so selected as a test sample, Carlin then devised a questionnaire
for use in the main study by correlating responses to test questions
with his informants' evaluation of the respondent; those questions
which fairly consistently discriminated between the "ethical" and the
"unethical" lawyers as defined by the lawyer-informants were retained.
Apparently Carlin gave the lawyer-informants no guidance regarding
the criteria to be applied in making their evaluations, and none of
them articulated his own. The reader is thus left somewhat up in the
air regarding the "ethics" which some segments of the bar are found
to uphold more than others. Presumably they are somewhat different
from those which would have been studied had Carlin used judges,
1. LL.B., 1954, Yale University; Ph.D. (Sociology), University of Chicago. Also author
of LAWYEs ON THEm OW N: A STUDY OF INDIVIDUAL PRACTITIONERS iN CiurAco (1962).
2. The Bronx and Manhattan, or two of New York City's five counties.
3. See, e.g., J. CAR iN, LAWTPS' ETHICS: A SuRVEY OF THE NEW Yomx BAR 65 n.17 (196).
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court clerks, clients, or only lawyers regarded as extremely ethical or
extremely unethical as his informants. But since the principal value
of the book-especially for lawyers-lies in the questions which it
raises rather than those which it answers, this ambiguity must be con-
sidered a blemish rather than a major flaw.
As would be true of any sociological study with ambitions beyond
the restatement of the obvious, this is a book with which one can quib-
ble. The discussion of formal controls, 4 for example, dismisses rather
too lightly the distress of a lawyer called before the grievance com-
mittee of one of the bar associations, even if the complaint is disposed
of informally. The gradations of quality of practice are perforce some-
what arbitrary. Members of the many high quality small firms which
compete in every way with the giants of the New York bar will be un-
happy if not surprised to find the level of their practice downgraded.6
Members of the New York County Lawyers' Association may likewise
hesitate to accept the assertion that theirs is the city's "non-elite" as-
sociation as compared to the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York.6 Most important, it must be doubted whether the principal con-
clusion-that the low status members of the bar are guilty of signi-
ficantly more unethical conduct than their elite colleagues-is as
shocking as Carlin makes it appear. Of course it is disturbing to be
told that any segment of the profession misconducts itself with fre-
quency; yet it would seem that we should cheer the fact-if it be such
-that the profession's elite are at least relatively untarnished. On the
other hand, it is impossible to find any comfort in his conclusion that
in areas of the bar with relatively low ethics, even highly ethical young
lawyers tend quickly to be dragged down to the prevailing low level.7
As interesting as is Carlin's analysis of the causes of unethical be-
havior, I suspect that the average practicing attorney will be more con-
cerned with the questions which Carlin raises and ignores regarding
the proper definition of "ethical." Although it may have seemed a
reasonable working hypothesis for Carlin's purposes, the lawyer exam-
ining his profession cannot assume that all who conform to the Canons
are ethical, or that all who do not are not.
The Canons and Carlin's informants-perhaps because of their
position in the bar-are tolerant of many practices which are arguably
4. Id. at 150-64.
5. Id. at 22-40.
6. Id. at 56.
7. Id. at 107-09.
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as noxious as the practices they condemn as unethical. The lawyer who
gives a case of liquor to a judge or court clerk is justly criticized, but
what of the lawyer whose political activities make him a crucial figure
in the choice of a dominant political party's candidate for the appellate
bench? Charges that lawyers with the right personal or political con-
nections have regularly been appointed special guardians by the New
York Surrogates' Courts, and have been awarded excessive fees from
the funds of their involuntary clients, have caused a political uproar
in the state and led to widespread calls for organizational reforms, but
I have yet to see a suggestion from the organized bar's official guardians
of purity that these lawyers might be proper subjects of their inquiry.
From the perspective of a layman or even of a concerned lawyer the
Canons may well seem to place an undue emphasis on the protection
of lawyers from each other. Regardless of the impact of a lawyer's bold-
face telephone directory listing or other "advertisements" on the pro-
fession's image or on his colleagues' business, it seems ridiculous to tar
him with the same brush used for the lawyer who misappropriates his
clients' funds.
The marginal practitioner who regularly undercuts his local associ-
ation's minimum fee is officially condemned, regardless of the quality
of his work. The official rationale for this is that low fees may lead to
less than first-class work. Low fees may at times have such an effect,
but so too may any number of other factors, ranging from excessive
use of alcohol to excessive zeal in the pursuit of public affairs at the
expense of time and attention devoted to clients. Thus, while low fees
are singled out as "unethical" without regard to their actual effect in
a particular case, practices equally inimical to high-quality legal work
go unexamined.
In some cases, such as the ceilings on contingent fees, the Canons
may at once bar perfectly fair arrangements while in effect sanctioning
clearly noxious practices. The potential client who cannot afford a re-
tainer, but who has a difficult case which does not hold out the promise
of a large monetary recovery, may not be able to find a lawyer willing
to take his case, even though he would be quite willing to give the
lawyer a contingent fee far greater than the permitted percentage. Such
a client would be effectively denied his right to counsel in the name of
ethics." On the other hand, the attorney who regularly presents his
8. It should be noted that the mechanical limitations do not ordinarily apply to con-
tingent fees which are supervised on an ad hoc basis by the courts, such as those involved
in private antitrust litigation and stockholder derivative suits in which the fees awarded
have been known to exceed the recovery.
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clients with a printed retainer agreement providing for the maximum
permissible contingent fee-even in cases where a large recovery for
relatively little effort can be expected-is held above reproach.
The organized bar's insistence on treating the restriction and regula-
tion of competition as a question of ethics, and its relative neglect of
other more genuine ethical problems9 have consequences reaching far
beyond its internal affairs. As Carlin suggests in his conclusion, the
trade association activities in which the organized bar indulges in the
name of ethics have already compelled intervention by the Supreme
Court in order to guarantee even remotely adequate representation
for the unsophisticated or unmoneyed members of society.10 And I
would argue that many of the more drastic rules of criminal procedure
which the Supreme Court has promulgated in the last several years
have been compelled in part by the bar's abdication of responsibility
in areas of genuine ethical concern.
The exclusionary rules, after all, require courts to close their eyes to
what is often admittedly probative and reliable evidence whenever it
has been obtained by forbidden means. Viewed outside the profes-
sional setting in which they were made, these rules would be incompre-
hensible. Ordinarily it is a matter of complete indifference to a trial
court whether the defendant before it has himself been the victim of
crime. If he has, the state will prosecute the guilty party in a separate
trial, and the victim can always pursue whatever civil remedies may be
open to him. Meanwhile, the court's business is to ascertain the truth
in the case at hand. Why, then, should it be different when the de-
fendant has been victimized by a policeman or a prosecutor? Why in
this case must the second crime be prosecuted by hiding evidence of
the first?
The answer is of course that the Court has had to intervene in this
clumsy way because no one else would police the police. Virtually
every state makes it a crime for the police knowingly to violate the
civil liberties of the accused. Yet the prosecutions which have been
made for such violations could probably be tallied on the ten fingers,
and the private civil remedies are notoriously inadequate. Thus, the
9. The ethics committees' preoccupation with the regulation-of-competition aspects of
the Canons can be seen from the tabulation of previously unreported decisions of the
American Bar Association in H. DawER, LE AL Eamcs 283-303 (1953). Drinker lists twelve
decisions on the "General Duty of Upright Behavior," id. at 284.85 and four on "Fairness
to Other Lawyers," id. at 295-96, but 214 on the permissible and impermissible ways of
competing for clients, id. at 285-95.
10. J. CAauN, supra note 3, at 178.
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police who violate the accused's rights go unprosecuted, and without a
prosecution the courts are powerless to act against them except by the
indirect and inefficient sanction of the exclusionary rules. If prosecu-
tors did their duty, the courts would not be obliged to cripple them-
selves in doing theirs.
To condone the systematic commission of crimes, by failing to
prosecute those who work directly or indirectly on the prosecutor's
behalf, must be considered unethical even if no official committee has
declared it so. Yet the organized bar does nothing to discipline or even
to rebuke the prosecutors who will not prosecute. Perhaps the com-
mittees are too busy regulating competition and smoothing over dis-
putes between lawyers and their clients. Or perhaps they are reluctant
to enter the "political" thicket. Indeed, in the light of their record in
other areas, perhaps they would be poor policemen of the political
establishment if they did enter that thicket. Or perhaps they are not
concerned with the grievances of the average criminal defendant, who
is not much of a potential client anyway. In any case, the fact is they
do not act.
Moreover, even if it be deemed inappropriate for the bar to assume
disciplinary responsibility over the conduct of a public office, there can
be no excuse for its indifference to blatant malfeasance by prosecutors
in their role as members of the legal profession. Those relatively few
prosecutors who deliberately suppress evidence helpful to the defense
or present false or misleading evidence on behalf of the people are
guilty of the grossest professional misconduct which a lawyer can com-
mit. Yet a national magazine article on the dishonest prosecutor could
conclude that "[n]ot in living memory has any American prosecutor
ever been punished in any way for falsifying or misrepresenting evi-
dence."'1
Problems such as these indicate inadequacies in the Canon of Ethics
as applied which have necessarily been carried over into Professor
Carlin's study as well. Carlin has helped to lay them bare, which is all
that the bar can ask of any sociologist. A sequel that succeeds in cover-
ing the entire ethical field will have to await the results of some real
grappling by lawyers with the question with which we began: what
should be the precepts of legal ethics?
JoHN A. YouNot
11. Tnm, Mar. 31, 1967, at 73.
j- Member, New York Bar. BA. 1960, Oberlin College; LL.B. 1964, New York Univcr-
sity.
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Lawyers' Ethics: A Survey of the New York City Bar. By
Jerome E. Carlin. New York: Russell Sage Foundation,
1966. Pp. 267. $6.75.
All professions have codes of ethics. These codes deal mainly with
relations between the professional and the client, the professional and
his fellow professionals and the professional and society. Some are con-
cerned with standards of society applicable to everyone; others with
standards applicable to the practitioner. These latter grow out of the
specific demands of his job and cover a limited area of life.
Lawyers more than any other group are concerned about developing
a body of decisions delineating ethical conduct in their profession.
Canons of ethics have been detailed by bar associations, committees on
professional ethics and state courts. In this way, with the help of stu-
dents of these decisions, a "common law" for lawyers has developed.1
In Lawyers' Ethics, Jerome E. Carlin, an attorney (LL.B., 1954,
Yale Law School) and sociologist (Ph.D., University of Chicago), writes
about the ethical standards of the legal profession. He is among the
first to concentrate on one aspect of a profession, looking at the legal
profession "horizontally" rather than "vertically."2 In recent years,
interest in lawyers-mainly on the part of sociologists-has produced
a welter of books and articles which describe and analyze the various
specialties and segments of the legal profession. Material is now avail-
able on the solo lawyer,3 the matrimonial lawyer,4 the criminal lawyer,"
the Negro lawyer,6 the Detroit lawyer," the "Wall Street" lawyer,8 the
young lawyer 9 and even the student lawyer.10 While there are still
other segments of the bar to study-the corporate counsel,1 the female
lawyer,12 the government lawyer, the country lawyer, the patent law-
1. E.g., H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETmcs (1953).
2. For an earlier "horizontal" study of one aspect of lawyers' behavior, see W. Wry-
RAUCH, THE PERSONALrrY oF LAwYERs (1964).
3. J. CARLIN, LAwYERS ON THEIR OWN (1962).
4. H. O'GORMAN, LAWYERS AND MATRIMONAL CASES (1963).
5. A. WooD, Tim CRimINAL LAWYER (to be printed 1967).
6. W. Hale, The Career Development of the Negro Lawyer, 1958 (unpublished doctoral
dissertation, University of Chicago Library).
7. Ladinsky, Careers of Lawyers, Law Practice, and Legal Institutions, 28 Ar. So.
REv. 47 (1963).
8. E. SMIGEL, THE WALL STEET LAWYER (1964).
9. D. Lortie, The Striving Young Lawyer: A Study of Early Career Differentiation In
the Chicago Bar, 1958 (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Chicago Library),
10. W. Thielen, Socialization Processes Among Law Students, 1965 (unpublished doctoral
dissertation, Columbia University Library).
11. Studies on the corporate counsel are being conducted by J. Ladinsky, E. Smigel
and J. Schram.
12. C. Epstein is currently writing a doctoral dissertation on the female lawyer at
Columbia University.
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yer, the labor lawyer, and the practitioner who is both lawyer and
accountant-much progress has been made in describing the broad
outlines of the legal profession.
Carlin in his Lawyers' Ethics is concerned primarily with under-
standing why some lawyers conform to ethical standards and others do
not, why the law schools seem to play so small a part in instilling
students with ethical norms, and why the disciplinary measures taken
by the bar are so ineffective. The book is based on the responses of 801
private lawyers, an 85 per cent return from 247 different office suites
located in Manhattan and the Bronx. Each respondent was given a
long formal interview schedule. The responses were measured against
an Index of Ethical Behavior and were designed to determine ethical
responsibility in three main areas: obligations to clients, obligations to
colleagues and obligations to the administration of justice. The items
in the Index were chosen and validated by asking six lawyer-in-
formants to rate ten to twelve colleagues as ethical or unethical. Fifty-
one of the evaluated attorneys were interviewed, and items were
retained "if lawyers rated unethical actually reported taking the
unethical action more frequently than lawyers rated ethical."''
The results of Carlin's study show that the larger the law firm, the
more ethical its members; the smaller the firm, the less ethical its mem-
bers. This difference is explained by pointing to the stratification of
the bar. The lower strata are populated by the solo and small firm
lawyers who have the poorest clients, with the dirtiest legal work, work
which most large law firms will not and can afford not to take. This
practice includes criminal, negligence, and divorce law and bill collect-
ing; the income thus generated is both uncertain and unlikely to be
large. In his first book, Lawyers on Their Own, which supports his
present investigation, Garlin found that the solo practitioner "is
likely to be a bookkeeper, broker, and/or fixer."14 He maintains that
the pressure of these circumstances and clients force these under-privi-
leged lawyers into unethical behavior if they are to survive.
A contrasting situation exists for the lawyer in the large law firms.
My own study of the "Wall Street" lawyer confirms Carlin's findings
about the stratification of the bar and the ethics of lawyers in the large
offices. The firms I studied, however, were considered large if they
were composed of fifty or more lawyers (the largest had 168), while
Carlin labels firms with fifteen or more attorneys as large-not a huge
13. J. CAuN, LAwYERs' ETHicS: A SURVY OF Trim NEW Yom Cm' BR. 43 (1966).
14. J. CAPiN, LAwYERs oN THEm Own 209 (1962).
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size for New York City. The lawyers in the large firms I studied had a
secure practice and a sizable income, practiced in the higher courts,
and selected the kinds of work they wanted to do. They generally kept
their large corporate clients and consequently did not experience the
continuous problem of finding new clients.
There was no question about unethical practices among these large
law firm lawyers. The large law firm lawyers not only can afford to be
ethical; they cannot afford to be otherwise. Their corporate clients
would not tolerate unethical practices if only because of their allergy
to negative publicity. Furthermore, the practice of law in a large firm
is team practice, making it more difficult for the individual lawyer to
be unethical. Still these elite attorneys went out of their way to be
ethical. Not only did most of them obey the Canons, and the decisions
stemming from them, but they added their own stringent rules to those
already in existence and then policed them themselves. It is perhaps
also relevant that the original Canons were adopted in 1908 and the
last major revision came in 1928. They provide few special guidelines
for the practice of law in large partnerships-on the rights and duties
of the employee lawyer, or what the corporate lawyer's responsibility
is for giving both legal and business advice, or how a partnership
should deal with a corporate client, or to whom in the corporation he
owes his loyalty.
Carlin poses a number of important problems for both the lawyer
and the sociologist. His finding that three years of legal education-
whether at the best national law school or the poorest night school-
have no effect on the ethical attitudes of the graduates challenges the
influence of the law school on the neophyte. An attorney is ethical or
not, Carlin claims, because he was brought up that way or because he
is under pressure from his clients and his colleagues to be that way.
The law school itself is of little consequence.
The challenge to the social scientist is to explain these findings.
This is not an easy task because it is difficult to single out all the
variables which affect a person. An individual has ethical norms before
he attends law school. Does he or does he not learn the specific norms
which apply only to lawyers in law school? Is there really no change
due to his training after three years of schooling? If there is no change,
why is this so? The broader and more difficult question, of course, is
to explain when and under what circumstances people do change. At
what period of his life, if any, does a lawyer actually take on ethical or
unethical norms?
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What we are concerned with here is called the socialization process.
There are many definitions of socialization but one by Brim seems to
satisfy our present need. He defines it simply as "the process by which
persons acquire the knowledge, skills, and dispositions that make them
more or less able members of their society."' 5
There is little work to be found on adult socialization, partly be-
cause many psychiatrists and psychologists believe that personality (a
partial result of the socialization process) is set at some magic time-
such as when a person is six, seven or eight years of age. But there are
two other theories that challenge this view. The first proposes that the
basic personality is formed when a person is young, but that the more
superficial aspects of his behavior and personality can be changed to
meet the needs of new social situations. The other alleges that most
aspects of personality are formed early in life, but a person continues
to be socialized throughout his life.
It is difficult to determine just what Garlin's position is with refer-
ence to these theories. He finds that, "[i]nner disposition and external
pressures have a combined, cumulative effect on ethical conduct, and
are about equally influential."'16 How these forces can be considered
equal is not demonstrated. The confusion is heightened by two seem-
ingly contradictory statements found in his concluding chapter. The
first reports:
The lawyer's ethical concern is not markedly influenced by his
professional training, his status in the bar, or the vicissitudes of
his practice. More important is national origin and generation in
the United States, which suggests that early family influence may
be decisive in the development of ethical concernY
Yet one page earlier Carlin claims that it is the type of practice which
determines ethicality:
Jewish and Catholic lawyers have a lower ethics rating than
Protestant lawyers because they are more likely to be exposed to
pressures to violate ethical norms. Under similar conditions of
practice, Jewish and Catholic lawyers are no more likely to violate
norms than Protestant lawyers.' 8
His conclusions regarding the role of the law schools in the profes-
sionalization of lawyers are still open to question despite the rigor of
15. 0. BpIuzt & S. WHEELER, SoCIALIZATION Ara CUILDHOOD: Two Ess.*.ys 3 (1966).
16. J. CAIuN, supra note 13, at 148.
17. Id. at 170.
18. Id. at 169.
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his research and some support for his position.10 To find the answer to
this question it may be necessary to isolate the influence of law school
from the influence of other social variables. The best way to investigate
this process is to trace it before, during and after formal training, al-
though it will be difficult to completely isolate the key variables. This
was not done by Carlin, but it was not the major task he set for him-
self.
The apparent lack of change in ethical attitudes resulting from law
school experience is sometimes attributed to "anticipatory" socializa-
tion. Students, it has been reasoned, especially those who go to elite
schools, may already know what to expect and take on the appropriate
attitudes even before they arrive at these schools. It is difficult for me
to accept the findings that law schools or the type of law school a stu-
dent attends has little bearing on his professionalization. Perhaps the
results might have been different if all Harvard or Yale alumni had
not been treated together. The facts might point out that the Harvard
or Yale law school graduate at the bottom of his class did not learn as
much about legal ethics as did his more successful fellow students. By
lumping together the best students and the poorest the differences
between them may have been hidden. We also do not know what
bearing law review training has on ethicality. If the top of the class,
and especially the law review members, are sought by and take jobs
with large firms, it may be assumed that many at the bottom of the
class had to become solo lawyers or take positions with smaller firms.
It could be argued that anticipatory socialization was taking place in
the law schools and the result would then be reflected on the job-
with law review members and others at the top of the class preparing
for elite jobs, and the bottom of the class preparing for what was left
over.
The situation would have been clarified if it had been possible for
Carlin to determine which members of his sample had ethical attitudes
before they entered the practice of the law and which had not. Then
we could estimate a little more closely what part "background" (basic
personality) and what part the pressures of practice (adult socialization)
play in determining ethicality. Some studies show that a degree of
socialization does take place during the three year experience of law
school; Thielen,20 for example, found in his work on the socialization
19. R. Simon, An Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Curriculum Innovations in Law
Schools, 1965 (mimeographed, National Council Legal Clinics).
20. W. Thielen, supra note 10.
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of law students that some changes do take place there. An unpublished
study of Indiana University law students,2L through a series of situa-
tional questions on legal ethics, disclosed that a change from a less
ethical position to a more ethical position occurred when first year
law students were compared with third year law students. However,
when practicing lawyers from the same town in which the law school
was located were- compared with third year law students, it was found
that the lawyers' attitudes toward legal ethics were the same as those of
the first year students. This information about practicing lawyers sup-
ports Carlin's conclusions that the lawyer is socialized on the job. But
the entire Indiana survey gives evidence in support of the theory that
adult socialization occurs both in law school and after law school.
If Carlin is correct that law schools are not influential in helping
students internalize ethical standards, perhaps the schools also fail to
teach other pertinent norms of the profession. Perhaps new methods of
teaching or a different curriculum are necessary, although Carlin and
others22 do not think this will do the trick.
Another problem which Carlin poses is of importance to both law-
yers and sociologists; it concerns the value of ethical norms, the polic-
ing of these norms, and the punishment for breaking them. He finds
that only about 85 lawyers are brought before the various grievance
committees in New York City every year, and for the period 1951 to
1962, the Appellate Division only disbarred an average of 10 a year.
Others, however, were allowed to resign before their cases were heard.
Carlin concludes that the punishment and the policing of norms are
ineffective. They are not observed and do not serve as a deterrent.
Here, too, one might take issue with him. There is no conclusive find-
ing about the effect of punishment as a deterrent except that it is
known that the death penalty for murder is not a deterrent for that
crime, at least in the short run. Some experts believe, however, that in
certain situations punishment does function as a deterrent. It is im-
portant to find out under what circumstances this occurs. Some evi-
dence does exist that laws, in themselves, act as a deterrent even when
not enforced because they have a moral force of their own.P Perhaps
canons of legal ethics possess these properties.
In the legal profession certainly the elite would feel the stigma of
21. E. Smigel, J. Martin & D. Homing, Legal Ethics and Education, 1958 (unpublished
study in Indiana University Library).
22. R. Simon, supra note 19, at 119.
23. Cf. Smigel, Public Attitudes Toward "Chiseling" with Rcerence to Unemployment
Compensation, 18 Am. Soc. REv. 59. 61-63 (1953).
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even having their names placed before the Grievance Committee.
Approximately 1,450 complaints are filed in New York City each year.
Solo lawyers may not feel this pressure, since many of them do not
consider themselves professionals, but rather businessmen. Presumably
they are bound not by professional norms but by business norms,
which are often quite different.
In fact, it is the elite of every profession that upholds the profes-
sional norms and polices them and keeps or changes them. They have
more to lose by disobedience; they have more to gain by bettering the
image of their profession; they are usually better trained; they often
control the associations whose job it is-initially at least-to see that
the rules of the profession are obeyed.
Carlin's book Lawyer's Ethics is important and challenging. It calls
on the legal profession to examine the function and effectiveness of its
law schools and its bar associations. It asks lawyers to consider revising
the Canons and eliminate the class distinctions which exist in the bar.
For sociology, the challenge is also significant because it questions our
beliefs about socialization and deterrence, and applies a model which
deserves at least consideration in the analysis of deviant behavior.
ERWIN 0. SMXGEVL
Neighborhood Foundations Memoranda. Institute for
Policy Studies. Washington, D.C., 1965-67.
Genuinely democratic decision-making often seems inconsistent with
effective government. Widespread direct participation is possible only
in very small political units, but in an urban-industrial society increas-
ing numbers of governmental functions can be performed only for
metropolitan or larger areas.
One possible resolution of this apparent conflict is, as G.D.H. Cole
has put it, "to create, and to give real power to, both larger and
smaller units of administration."' This idea dates back at least to
Thomas Jefferson, who wanted to create "ward-republics" as the base
of "a gradation of authorities." "[E]very man in the State," he hoped,
"would thus become an acting member of the common government,
f Professor of Sociology and Chairman, Department of Sociology, New York University.
A.B. 1939, University of North Carolina; M.A. 1942, Ph.D. 1949, New York University.
i. G. D. H. CoLx, LOCAL AND REGIONAL GOVERNMENT 260 (1947).
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transacting in person a great portion of its rights and duties, subordi-
nate indeed, yet important, and entirely within his competence."-
A number of contemporary writers, including Cole,3 Paul Good-
man,4 Hannah Arendt and Charles Frankel," have suggested modem
adaptations of Jefferson's concept. Goodman, for instance, calls for "a
city of federated communities," each exercising "considerable auton-
omy" over some functions "within a municipal administration that
controls . . whatever is necessarily or conveniently centralized."
7
The Institute for Policy Studies' Neighborhood Foundations Memo-
randa discuss a project currently testing some of these ideas.8 Milton
Kotler, one of the Institute's Resident Fellows, helped fourteen hun-
dred residents of a Columbus, Ohio neighborhood form the East
Central Citizens' Organization (ECCO), a non-profit membership
corporation which receives federal funds to operate a settlement house
and conduct social service programs." The corporation is governed by
2. Letter to Joseph C. Cabell, Feb. 2, 1816, in Tim LiTn AND SELEcTE Wurmrcs or
THOW.S JEFFERSON 660-62 (A. Koch & W. Peden eds. 1944); Letter to Major John Cart-
wright, June 5, 1824, in Tn ComLT JEFFERSON 293-97 (S. Padover ed. 1943). For an
excellent summary of Jefferson's views in this regard, see H. ARnNoi, ON REvOLUTo.i 234-
59 (1968).
3. LOCAL AND REGIONAL GovERNrENT (1947); THE Fura or Loc:&r Gov~'.Ntssar (1921).
4. PEOPLE OR PERSONNEL (1965); TnE Socmxry I Lwn IN Is MINE 127-33 (1962); UTOPAN
ESSAYS AND PRAcrcAL PROPOSALS 150-52 (1962); CosssuNrrAs 52-56 (1947) (with Percival
Goodman).
5. ON REvOLUnON 217-85 (1963).
6. TnE DEMOCRATIC PROsp='T (1962); Values for Urban Planning, PROC. OF As. INsr.
OF PLANNERS CONF. 21-80 (1963); A Comment by Charles Frankel, in CENr For TulE
STUDY OF DEMOCRATnc INsrIrUONS, THE ELrrE AND TIE ELEcroRAE 8, 10 (1963). Cf.
JAYAPRAKASH NARAYAN, SOCMALISM, SARVODAYA AND DEMOCRAC'Y 192-238 (1964). See also
Flacks, On the Uses of Participatory Democracy, 13 DIssE-r 701 (1966); L)nd, The New
Radicals and "Participatory Democracy," 12 Diss-r 324, 332 (1965).
7. P. GOODmAN, UTOPIA ESSAYS AND PRAcrcAL PRoxorm-s 151 (1962); P. GoODMAN,
PEOPLE OR PERSONNEL 15-16 (1965).
8. The Memoranda are on file with the author and available free from the Institute
for Policy Studies, 1520 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. Memo-
randa Nos. 15 and 16 reprint testimony in Hearings on the Federal Role in Urban Afairs
Before the Subcomm. on Executive Reorganization of the Senate Comm. on Government
Operations, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 9 (1966).
9. ECCO was officially formed in August 1965, with the help of two Student Non-
Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) workers. Its articles of incorporation and by-las
are on file and available from the Institute for Policy Studies. It has received grants from
the National Council of Churches, the Stern Family Fund, the federal Office of Economic
Opportunity, and the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, among others.
Its programs include pre-school, day care, job development and referral, tutoring, emer-
gency food, consumer education, homemaker services, senior citizens' activities, planned
parenthood, legal services and a youth civic center. The First English Lutheran Church
of Columbus donated the settlement house when it followed its parishioners to suburbia.
Church pastor Leopold Bernhard is the author of Memoranda Nos. 10A and 11. Kotler
wrote all the other Memoranda except No. 16 written by Mrs. Lawrence Love, Executive
Director of ECCO. For further discussion of ECCO, see Ridgeway, Missionaries in Darhest
Ohio, Tn NEv REuBuc, Feb. 5, 1966, at 9; Note, Antipoverty Community Corporations,
CoLUm. J. OF LAW & Soc. PROD., May 8, 1967, at 10.
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a Neighborhood Assembly "conducted in the manner of a town-meet-
ing.'"' Members assemble at least twice annually to make basic policy
and elect an Executive Council which makes more specific decisions
and employs a full-time staff.'1 They also serve on Executive Council
committees and participate in the activities of the neighborhood clubs
which elect 16 of the 30 Council members.
Influenced by ECCO, Senator Ribicoff recently introduced a "Neigh-
borhood Development Corporation Assistance Act" to authorize
federal financial aid to neighborhood corporations. 2 Queens parents
as well as civil rights and New Left activists advocate neighborhood
control and citizen participation. An experiment in voluntary neigh-
borhood home rule may now be politically possible.
Such an experiment could go beyond Kotler's concept of the neigh-
borhood corporation; it could constitute a new level of government in
American cities. Neighborhood residents could be delegated authority,
within their territory, over aspects of such important municipal func-
tions as elementary education and land planning and development. The
new units would be part of a federal system in which national, state,
metropolitan, and municipal government would perform most func-
tions, prescribe minimum standards and general plans, collect and
redistribute revenue, and provide central purchasing, audit, research,
and other services. These higher levels of government would neither
organize or administer the neighborhood governments, but would
aid residents of urban neighborhoods who so choose to form self-
governing polities and control certain delegable functions.
This new voluntary federal system would be flexible and experi-
mental. Different combinations of neighborhood size, internal govern-
ment structure, responsibilities, and higher-level support would be
tested for widespread participation and effective administration.
10. ECCO By-Laws, art. IV, § 2. The Assembly has authority to remove Council mem-
bers for cause, approve or terminate programs, amend corporate by-laws, investigate
neighborhood problems, and initiate new programs. Special meetings may be called by a
majority of the Executive Council or by petition of three Council members and twenty
other members.
11. Each Executive Council member serves for one year and for this service receives a
stipend of $1000. At least four of the fourteen at-large members must be "teenagers."
ECCO By-Laws, art. V, § 1.
12. S. 1433, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., introduced April 5, 1967 and referred to the Committee
on Banking and Currency. The Act would also direct appropriate federal agencies to
study and report to the President and Congress on "the most practicable ways to coordi-
nate the activities of neighborhood development corporations with federally assisted
programs and activities for improving housing conditions, increasing employment and
business opportunities, [and] expanding worker productivity through job training and
education." Id. § 5(b).
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What Is a Neighborhood?
Contemporary urban subdivisions are themselves the size of small
cities. The boroughs of London, for instance, average 250,000 people.13
New York's community planning districts average about 100,000 (well
over that in such areas as Central Harlem and Bedford-Stuyvesant) 4
and its local school boards and proposed local city halls serve more than
200,000 people.-5 The Ribicoff Bill defines "urban neighborhood" to
include areas with up to fifty thousand residents."0 Giving such "dis-
tricts" real power in large cities would make public officials more
responsible to local groups and increase the political influence of resi-
dentially-concentrated minority groups, but because of numbers alone
most people would still be excluded from actual decision-making, aside
from voting and occasional lobbying.
Although no empirical data are available on an optimal size for wide-
spread, active participation, the scale of ECCO (8150 people, of whom
about 4200 are 16 and over) and of the neighborhoods Goodman sug-
gests (2000 residents) seems a more fruitful starting point. This, con-
veniently, is roughly the scale of the city planners' "neighborhood,"
a few blocks or a long, densely-populated "block-front" (rows of build-
ings facing each other across a street) which residents perceive as an
entity, often because of natural boundaries or unifying institutions such
as an elementary school, a community center, or a small shopping
area.17 Tentative boundaries could be mapped on the basis of electoral
districts, standards of compactness and contiguity, rough population
limits and public hearings and survey research to determine which
areas the residents of a city identify as its neighborhoods.'8 Areas desig-
13. CONSERVATIV PotLTC~l. CztN-a=, GREATER LoNDO,; GovEuRNwmr 14 (1964).
14. There are 87 districts in a city of almost 8 million people. See Crnz,,s' Uxto.,
CommrNrrY ADmNISTRATION Wrmu NEW Yoan Crr, 9-11 (1952); Harrington, One Man's
Humanizing Is Another's Anarchy, Village Voice, June 18, 1964 at 3. See also Dr.-orkis.
A Program for Community Districts in New York City, 3 PRA r P.ANNIN PAErS, Nov.
1964, at 21.
15. New York City has 30 local school districts and plans 27 local city halls. NEw
YoRK Crry BOARD oF EuCATIoN, DRcoRY 20-49 (1966-67); Samuels, Council Getting Bill
for Little City Halls, New York World Journal Tribune, Jan. 4, 1967, at 27, cols. 1-2.
16. S. 1433, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3, 2 (1967).
17. The size suggested here coincides with the lower end of Senator Ribicoffs range
of 1500 to 50,000. On the distinction between "district" and "neighborhood," see Cnm"
UNION, supra note 14, at 7; J. JAcoBs, THE DrATit AND LIFE OF GREAT A ,srluc'un Cmrns
112-40 (1961); J. CUNNINGHAm, THE REsuRGENT NEIGHBORHOOD 23-42 (1965); H. GANS,
THE U AN VmLAGERs 11 (1962). It is neither necessary nor desirable that neighborhoods
be self-contained and inward-turned as proposed in Perry, The Neighborhood Unit, in
7 REGioNAL SURVEy oF NEw YORK AND ITs ENvIRo,s 21 (1929).
18. Census tracts, and the "neighborhood analyses" which municipal planning agencies
conduct in order to receive federal urban reneial subsidies, might also provide helpful
guides since both are based on population characteristics, living conditions, topographic
and man-made barriers, and higher-level administrative districts. In 1 U.S. DnrAnr.nz:-r
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nated neighborhoods could later adjust common boundaries, subdivide,
or annex adjoining "unincorporated" areas whose residents approved.
It might be argued that such neighborhoods would be racially and
economically homogeneous, and often dominated by a single ethnic
group, and that as a result neighborhood self-government would con-
tribute to parochialism and segregation. But parochialism is based
mainly on lack of satisfying relations with diverse types of people and
insufficient exposure to varied environments and ideas. Participation in
neighborhood governments might considerably expand opportunities
for wider contact. The neighborhoods would not be self-contained and
inward-turned. Participants in neighborhood government throughout a
city or state would probably convene frequently to consider common
problems. 19 With the skills and sense of competence they developed
through sharing in local government, neighborhood residents might
find involvement in the larger society easier and more rewarding. As
they became more active outside their neighborhood, they would
probably join organizations which cut across neighborhood lines and
bridge ethnic, political and class groupings as well.
In any event neighborhood governments would be bound by the
equal protection clause and civil rights legislation; they could not
deliberately exclude minorities or engage in any other form of dis-
crimination. Beyond these precautions, there is no basis for giving
special consideration in administering neighborhood self-government
to race, ethnicity, or class. Herbert Gans, a liberal sociologist and plan-
OF COMMENRCE, BUREAu OF THE CENSUS, CENSUS OF POPULATION: 1960, pt. A, at xxviii, "census
tracts" are defined as
small areas into which large cities and metropolitan areas have been divided for
statistical purposes. Tract boundaries were established cooperatively by a local
committee and the Bureau of the Census, and were generally designed to achieve
some uniformity of population characteristics, economic status, and living conditions.
Initially, the average tract had about 4,000 residents. Tract boundaries were estab-
lished with the intention of being maintained over a long time so that comparisons
may be made from census to census.
Neighborhood analyses are one of the seven required components of the Workable Program
for Community Improvement. The Urban Renewal Administration directs that neighbor-
hood boundaries may be determined in one of three ways:
[1] along traditional lines--similar physical, economic, social or other characteristics
which make for a dearly identifiable entity-2] along lines formed by geographic or
natural barriers, such as rivers or an abrupt change in the contour of the land, or
by man-made barriers, such as a major thoroughfare or a highway or by a different
land use . . . [3] on the basis of an area served by a single public facility such as an
elementary school, park, or community center.
U.S. HOUSING AND HOME FINANCE AGENGY, 'WORKABLE PROGRAM FOR COMMUNITY IMPROVE-
IENT: ANSWERS ON NEIGHBORHOOD ANALYSES 1 (1962).
l. To facilitate residents' involvement in higher-level politics, neighborhoods could
be identical with, or wholly within, the electoral districts of higher-level governments
and elected representatives could be required to meet regularly with neighborhood resi-
dents. Cf. G. D. H. COLE, supra note 1, at 60.
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ner, has argued persuasively for freely chosen "moderate homogeneity"
in neighborhood-scale residential groupings on the ground that, without
countervailing disadvantages, it greatly enhances community. Neigh-
borhood self-government should reduce present disparities in resource
allocation and program quality, and to the extent that it increased the
overall political influence of minority groups, it could promote stronger
government action against discrimination.21
Neighborhood Governments
Once neighborhoods were designated, their residents would be free
to decide whether or not to form political units, and if so, to determine
in large part the government's form and functions. -
If a neighborhood chose to "incorporate," an elected committee
could prepare alternative drafts of a charter and hold local hearings
on them. An open assembly would revise the charter committee's drafts
and approve a final draft, which might then be placed before neighbor-
hood residents in a referendum.23
Some charter provisions would have to be required to protect future
residents, minorities, and dissenters, and to guarantee ample oppor-
tunity for all residents to participate actively. Requiring procedures for
reasonably easy charter amendment and periodic charter review would
preserve future residents' opportunity to adjust institutions in light
of experience under home rule. Latecoming residents and minorities
would also be protected by an inclusive definition of neighborhood resi-
dent, perhaps as "a person age 18 or over whose regular place of abode
is within neighborhood boundaries."24 And of course, the Bill of
Rights, the Fourteenth Amendment, and state constitutional restric-
tions on governmental action would apply to neighborhood govern-
20. Gans, Planning and Social Life, 27 J. A.t. Ix%sr. PLANNERS 134 (1961); Gans, The
Balanced Community, 27 J. Ar. Isr. P. ANrs 176 (1961).
21. Cf. Jencks & Kotler, A Government of the Blach, by the Black, and for the Black,
RPWrresa, July 1966, at 51.
22. This procedure would insure that neighborhood governments were established only
where they were wanted, thereby testing popular interest in neighborhood government.
It would also prevent the domination by higher-level authorities which often results
from top-down organization of supposedly grass-roots groups. For examples of domina-
tion and manipulation resulting from such procedures, see P. SELzxMczM, TVA AND WE
GRAss Roois 217-46 (1949); Marcuse, The Anti-Povcrty Program: Attack on the Symptoms
or Attack on the Source?, 3 P ,Tr PLANNiNG PAPERS, Oct. 1965 at 21, 29-33.
23. Throughout this process professional staff employed by higher-level governments-
and in many places independent community organizers as well-would be available to
assist and advise neighborhood residents.
24. Any durational residence requirement would discriminate against people who are
geographically mobile and would bear little relationship to a person's stake in neighbor-
hood decisions.
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ments.2 5 Some set of specific procedural rules-regarding conduct of
meetings and impeachment of officers, for instance-might also be re-
quired.
Neighborhood residents would of necessity have to elect some neigh-
borhood officials. Each neighborhood charter would be required,
however, to provide for at least an annual assembly in which all resi-
dents could participate and vote; the assembly would set general policy,
terminate programs initiated by neighborhood officials, and mandate
neighborhood officials to execute specified measures. Assembly attend-
ants might be paid, as they were at times in Athens.20 A reasonable
quorum requirement would prevent government by a small minority;
if a prescribed minimum number of electors did not attend an as-
sembly, the officials would continue to govern until the next assembly
or election.
Only the assembly would be required. Although most neighborhoods
would probably choose to add traditional institutions (an elected fixed-
term representative council, executive officers, and perhaps judicial
officials), neighborhoods which so wished would be free to experiment
with greater popular participation in decision-making. Some neighbor-
hoods might hold assemblies monthly. As in Athens, officials of some
neighborhoods might be selected by lot, from volunteer panels, and
permitted only a single term of one or two years; offices might even be
filled by new occupants each month, as in some of the community
projects that the Students for a Democratic Society has organized in
American urban slums.2" Residents with special interests in particular
functions (such as the parents of elementary school children) might be
appointed as committees of the assembly to oversee their performance.
Neighborhood Powers
Residents of a home rule neighborhood could empower their govern-
ment to perform a broad range of functions. Any higher-level body
could of course delegate portions of its powers to willing neighborhood
25. Participation might well increase residents' commitment to civil liberties. S.
STOUFFER, COMMUNISM, CONFORMITY, AND CIVIL LmERTEs (1955) found a close correlation
between civil libertarian attitudes and leadership in voluntary organizations. Although
this is often taken to show that civil libertarians assume leadership more often than non-
civil-libertarians, it could also mean that people become more committed to civil liberties
when they participate personally in situations in which those liberties are important.
26. These and subsequent references to the Athenian system of direct democracy are
based on H. MAYo, AN INTRODUCTION To DEMOCRATIC THEORY 35-41 (1960). A somewhat
similar model, the New England town meeting, is described briefly in C. ADRIAN, GOVERN-
ING URBAN AMERICA 230-31 (1955).
27. See Kopkind, Of, by and for the Poor, THE NEw REPUBLIC, June 19, 1965, at 15.
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governments. But to ensure that neighborhoods had real power, some
important functions would have to be delegable solely at the choice of
neighborhood residents. Until we learn more about how neighborhood
government works in practice, functions can be classified only tenta-
tively. A neighborhood government would be entitled to only those
functions which it could perform without substantial impact on non-
residents. Interdependent functions would be delegable only as a
group, so that neighborhood residents would have to choose between
empowering their government to perform all or none of them.2 Prob-
lems which recognize no geographic boundaries (such as pollution,
communicable disease, and through traffic) would have to be dealt with
by higher levels of government, although higher level bodies might at
their discretion delegate to neighborhood governments control over
some discrete aspects of these activities.2 9
Neighborhood governments could control aspects of many other
important functions. They could provide, for people of all economic
levels, the kinds of services that ECCO and poverty program commu-
nity action agencies now offer the poor-pre-kindergarten and adult
education, day-care centers, credit unions, legal, medical, psychiatric,
and job-placement services, and advice and assistance in dealing with
private firms and public agencies. They could also develop as neighbor-
hood level public institutions such facilities as newspapers and radio
stations, community restaurants, consumer cooperatives, and even co-
operatively owned business and industry.30
The ownership of public facilities which are used almost exclusively
by the residents of a single neighborhood or a small group of neighbor-
hoods (such as small parks, recreation facilities, elementary school
buildings) could be transferred to the neighborhood government-
Branch libraries could be turned over to neighborhoods which, while
28. Cf. U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNME.NTAL RErATIONs, PEaRFOMANCE OF
URBAN FUNCTIONs: LOCAL AND AREAwME 8 (1963).
29. The same procedure would be required for planning, developing, and regulating
facilities and institutions which necessarily serve areas larger than neighborhoods or
small groups of neighborhoods, such as major industry, mass transit, central business
districts, major parks and recreation facilities, hospitals, and universities.
30. The Mississippi Poor Peoples Corporation sponsors a number of successful produc-
tion cooperatives which might provide useful models. G. D. H. COLE, supra note 1, at 52.
presents an interesting discussion of the benefits of a community restaurant. A proposal
for neighborhood-run radio in Newark, NJ., is set forth in Prospectus for NCUP Poor
People's Radio Station, NEw L=r NomTs, March 11, 1966, at 3. A professor of radio and
television at the University of Illinois has predicted that "technological break-
throughs" will soon make it possible to "establish small, local, publicly owned radio and
television stations" which "could reinstitute the function of the town meeting" by trying
to "involve the public as participants instead of audience." H. SroRNI, TEMvzsIoN AND
Socafrr 211-12, 225 (1965).
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continuing some central purchasing (based on local selection) and
perhaps employing some joint staff, could offer books and audio-visual
materials in their town halls and school buildings and perhaps in
mobile units. Existing public housing could be owned and operated by
neighborhood governments; projects housing several thousand tenants
could themselves be designated neighborhoods.
A neighborhood government could regulate within its boundaries
the use of public land and streets and the conduct of municipal police
and other officials. A neighborhood court whose decisions could be
reviewed by higher-level courts (perhaps de novo) could be established
to enforce local regulations and to provide initial interpretation of the
neighborhood's charter and laws.31
The most important delegable functions would be elementary edu-
cation and land planning and development. Neighborhood govern-
ments would be empowered to operate public elementary schools,
subject to higher-level regulations setting teacher qualifications, requir-
ing the teaching of basic skills and subject matter, and ensuring suffi-
cient uniformity to allow children to change schools without great
hardship. Within a framework of metropolitan or municipal plans,
neighborhoods (or groups of them) could enact and enforce zoning
regulations and plan and develop housing, small commerce and in-
dustry, local traffic and neighborhood facilities. They could enforce the
municipal housing code (perhaps promulgating some additional re-
quirements subject to municipal review) and act as public housing and
urban redevelopment authorities, with powers of eminent domain and
bond issuance.
Neighborhood governments performing these functions would be
supported by higher-level activities designed to preserve many of the
major advantages of centralization. Higher-level standards and plans
would provide essential coordination. A centrally-administered audit
of each neighborhood's finances would minimize petty corruption, es-
pecially if the results were distributed to neighborhood residents.
Higher-level research would make new technological developments
31. Other possible neighborhood judicial institutions are suggested in Cahn & Calm,
What Price Justice: The Civilian Perspective Revisited, 41 NoT'E DAMIE LAwYEa 927,
950-55 (1966). Neighborhood governments might place residents in training programs
for municipal police forces (and other departments of higher-level governments, such
as sanitation, fire, and building departments), under a procedure patterned after congres-
sional selection of West Point cadets. A fixed proportion of training places could be
set aside for neighborhood nominees who achieve satisfactory scores on standard tests.
If there were more neighborhoods with nominees than places for trainees, neighborhoods
could nominate in rotation.
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available to neighborhood governments. Central purchasing and the
sharing of higher-level specialized facilities and staff would effect
economies of scale insofar as neighborhood governments chose to use
those services.
To supplement residents' first-hand knowledge and rudimentary
skills and understanding, neighborhood and higher-level governments
would make available intensive, free instruction about delegable func-
tions and urban problems. Political activists would also be free to
propagate their views among neighborhood residents. Such education
and argument would be made meaningful by the prospect of real power
to put lessons into practice.
Experts would continue to be essential. They would be employed by
neighborhood governments to provide technical information helpful in
setting goals, to recommend means of achieving those goals, and to
help implement the neighborhood's decisions. But the neighborhood
assembly and elected officials would always determine goals and prior-
ities, subject to minimal higher-level restrictions. And residents would
always be able to pick which educators, social workers, and planners
worked for them, to reject their recommendations, and ultimately to
fire them. They could require experts to present alternatives and
explain their likely effects and costs. Especially in developing a physical
plan for the neighborhood, and perhaps on other discrete projects, a
number of experts could be asked to submit competing proposals. Or
residents could design their own homes, schools, and neighborhood,
looking to architects, educators, and planners for technical aid rather
than fully developed plans.
There are no a priori grounds for predicting that neighborhood
governments could not perform delegated functions as effectively as
higher-level bodies do now. With respect to public programs within
their territory, neighborhood residents should be at least as competent
as municipal and higher-level officials to guide and supervise the experts
who would remain directly responsible for most government action.
They would have the advantage of direct knowledge of the performance
of the functions they controlled and often could discover and correct
mistakes far more quickly than more remote bureaucrats.
The few neighborhoods which tested the limits of direct citizen
participation would provide important information on the practical
possibilities of separating value judgments from the technical and em-
pirical issues which require expertise. When neighborhood residents
erred, only they would suffer, since they would control only functions
which they performed for themselves within very limited boundaries. If
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they found a particular function too difficult to handle, they could
always cede it back to the higher-level body which previously performed
it or delegate greater authority to professional staff.
The benefits of widespread participation and successful innovations
cannot help but outweigh the possible effects of residents' mistakes.
Experts too have been known to fumble and to impose their own values
in the name of science. If the present state of urban planning and edu-
cation even approaches the horrors depicted in recent critiques, it is




All self-governing neighborhoods would be empowered to deal
directly with state and federal governments as well as private founda-
tions. Alone or in cooperation with a few adjoining neighborhoods,
they could receive funds as local planning and redevelopment agencies
under urban renewal laws, local housing authorities under federal
public housing legislation, community action agencies under the Eco-
nomic Opportunity Act, and local school districts under state and
federal aid-to-education legislation.
Although grants in aid would be an important, perhaps even the
largest, source of funds, they could not be the exclusive source if neigh-
borhood governments are to maintain effective political independence.
Neighborhood governments would need substantial assured revenues
to fulfill their duties.33 They might be authorized to levy property or
income surtaxes within prescribed, low limits, but redistribution of
revenues collected by higher-level governments seems preferable, 4 be-
32. On planning see, e.g., J. JACOBS, supra note 17; Alonso, Cities, Planners, and Urban
Renewal, in URBAN RENEWAL 437 (J. Wilson ed. 1966); Gerckens, The Planner at the
Human Racetrack, 33 J. AMl. INsT. PLANNERs 112 (1967); H. GANS, supra note 17, and
Gans, The Failure of Urban Renewal, ColMMENTARY, April 1965, at 29, reprinted In
URBAN RENFwAL, supra, at 537; C. ABRAMS, TnE CITY Is THE FRONTIER (1965); Hartman,
The Housing of Relocated Families, 30 J. AMr. INST. PLANNERS, 266 (1964) in URBAN RE-
NEWAL, supra, at 293; Fried, Grieving for a Lost Home in Tan URBAN CONDITION 151
(L. Duhl ed. 1963) and in URBAN RENEWAL, supra, at 359. On public education see, e.g.,
E. FRIEDENBERG, COMING OF AGE IN AMERICA (1965); P. GOODMAN, COMPULSORY MIS-
EDUCATION (19654); B. KAUFMAN, Up THE DowN STAIRCASE (1964); P. SEXTON, EDUCATION
AND INCOME (1961); M. MAYER, TaE ScHooLs (1961); Jencks, Is the Public School Obsolete?,
Tan PUBLIC INTEREST, Winter, 1966, at 18.
33. Although neighborhood-owned business enterprises might eventually provide these
funds for some of the new governments, such enterprises are unlikely to provide a stable
financial base for many neighborhoods.
84. To intensify residents' sense of stake in their neighborhood, direct payments to
neighborhood governments might be required from each tax-paying resident and then
subtracted from his income tax as a credit, and contributions of goods or labor might be
allowed as a partial substitute for such direct payments.
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cause public revenue structures are already chaotically fragmented and
reliance on neighborhood tax powers would penalize poor neighbor-
hoods. Neighborhood independence need not be compromised by
grants from above, provided redistribution is unconditional and on the
basis of legally enforceable neighborhood entitlement.
The Role of Higher Levels of Government
Higher levels of government would need not only to finance neigh-
borhood self-government, but also to draw neighborhood boundaries,
allocate authority, conduct charter committee elections and the various
neighborhood referenda, and ensure the presence of required provi-
sions in neighborhood charters.
To protect neighborhood autonomy, these functions should be per-
formed by governmental units higher than the municipal governments
which will give up power and revenue. Since the federal government
seems too far removed from urban neighborhoods to set and enforce
policies of this detail and since local government is traditionally regu-
lated by state governments, the state seems the logical level.
To promote flexibility and expertise a new administrative agency
might be established to interpret and apply home rule legislation and to
adjudicate conflicts among neighborhoods and between neighborhoods
and higher-level governments.5 Such an agency could also sponsor
independent research on neighborhood home rule, provide technical
assistance to neighborhood governments, and help neighborhoods work
together.
Several measures could be employed to protect neighborhood govern-
ments against domination from above. Higher-level bodies would of
course have to treat neighborhoods equitably, on the basis of reasonable
classifications. They could not perform delegated functions without
neighborhood permission. In the use of their retained powers they
would be prohibited from deliberately or unnecessarily interfering with
a neighborhood government's free exercise of its delegated powers.
35. Such a "Commission on Neighborhood Self.Government' should represent neighbor-
hoods and municipalities as well as the general public. The public members could con-
stitute the entire Commission for purposes of drawing initial boundaries and conducting
neighborhood referenda on whether or not neighborhoods would become self-governing.
Some reasonably short time after the boundaries were set, municipal officials and the
neighborhoods which chose home rule would select their members. This full Commission
would conduct the remainder of the process, setting charter requirements and allocating
powers.
A model neighborhood home rule act establishing such a Commission and making the
other proposed changes is available from the author.
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They could not, for instance, rezone or redevelop a neighborhood for
industrial use, highway construction, or institutional expansion without
establishing not only public purpose but also the absence of alternatives
not demonstrably inferior which would not destroy the community.81
And to restrict neighborhood elementary education or other social
services, a higher-level body would have to demonstrate a social need
for a particular uniformity (for example, that reading be taught in
elementary schools). A mere disagreement with a neighborhood's judg-
ment (such as over when and how to teach reading) would not be
sufficient.
37
The Need for a Test
In a world of alienation, participation in neighborhood politics could
restore, or create, community. A sense of belonging, power and worth
could replace feelings of rootlessness, helplessness, and insignificance. 8
Once ordinary people could determine the rate and form of planned
change, resistance to social innovation might diminish." Although most
neighborhoods would probably adopt traditional governmental forms
and programs, people with unusual values and tastes could congregate
in a few neighborhoods and develop utopian communities without
having to withdraw from urban life.
36. They might also required to compensate the residents for taking their neighbor-
hood.
37. Like the right to rebated revenues, these neighborhood rights would be enforceable
in the courts. In the case of neighborhood conflict with a municipal or state agency, they
would be enforceable only after an initial decision by the new state administrative agency.
38. Variants of these two propositions are advanced in; R. NisaEr, Tim Qur-r
FOR COMMUNITY (1953); W. KoRmNAusm, THE PoLmcs oF MASS SocIrY (1959); L. HAWORTIH,
THE GooD CITY (1963); R. DAHL 0, C. LINDBLOM, POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND WELFARE 267.71,
519-21 (1953); H. ARENDT, supra note 2, at 283; B. FROMM TIE SANE Socirrv (1955); B.
BROWNELL, THE HUMAN COMMUNITY (1950); Seeley, Planning Sanity, 1964 PLANNING 161,
167-68; Pilisuk, The Role of the Poor in the War on Poverty, THE COIRMPS'ONDENT,
Spring-Summer 1965, at 107-10.
Participation in neighborhood government could take the place of destructive anti-
social behavior. Cf. HARLM YoUTH OPPORTUNITIES UNLIMITED, INC., YOUTH IN TI1 GHLrto
(1964) (especially introduction and ch. 3); Solomon, Walker, O'Connor & Fishman, Civil
Rights Activity and Reduction in Crime Among Negroes, 12 ARcIIVES GEN. PSYCIIATRY
227 (1965); D. MATZA, DELINQUENCY AND DIurr 188-91 (1964); R. CLOWARD 9- L OILIN,
DELINQUENCY AND OPPORTUNITY (1960).
There is also evidence that what anti-social behavior did arise would be more effectively
controlled. Residents who participated in neighborhood government would try harder to
exercise control because they would identify more strongly with their community,
and their efforts would be more effective because they would be better organized and more
respected by their neighbors. See Maccoby, Johnson & Church, Community Integration and
the Social Control of Juvenile Delinquency, J. SoC. IssuEs, July 1958, at 38; Brager,
Organizing the Unaffiliated in a Low.Income Area, SOCIAL WORx, April 1963, at 94:
MOBILIZATION FOR YOUTH, A PROPOSAL FOR THE PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF DELINQUENCY
126-32 (1961).
39. Cf. A. SCHORR, SLUMS AND SOCIAL INSECURITY 68-73 (1963); E. HorrER, TnE ORDEAL OF
CHANGE (1963).
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Successful neighborhood self-government could also deepen democ-
racy. Decisions delegated to neighborhoods could be made with far
more participation than is presently possible. Active participants would
soon recognize that many of their basic grievances require municipal,
state or national change, and would very likely put to use at those levels
the skills and organization they had developed at the neighborhood
level. They would add a new and important set of forces to the pluralist
political process and could form part of the informed and active public
necessary for effective representative democracy.4 0
All this rests on the assumption that a large portion of the population
would actively participate in neighborhood government. Because op-
portunities for widespread direct participation do not now exist, 4 '
we do not know how many people would take part if they had the
chance. Admittedly, only a tiny portion of the adult population uses
the opportunities now available for political participation. This may
indicate that most Americans do not care about public issues, or it may,
in large part, reflect the disincentives to active participation which are
built into our present institutions of government. Several studies have
concluded that a great many people withdraw from politics because
they feel that political action is futile and there is no point in trying
because their efforts can't make any difference.42
40. The basic statement of the need for such a public and the causal importance of
direct participation in smaller units is J. Dmwvy, THE Punuc AND Irs PronLEs 110-20
(1927). See also the distinction between "mass" and "public" in C. MILLS, THE Pown ELIm
298-324 (1956). Views similar to Dewey's are set forth in: S. WoLN, PoLTrrCs A ?D VISION GO
(1960); G. D. H. CoLa, supra note 1, at 60-61; C. FPAX.EL, THE DE.tOCfATic Pnosvrcr 63
(1962); J. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 17, at 191-204; S. GirE, THE E ZrIm CrT 80, 97-106,
207-08 (1962).
41. The War on Poverty's "maximum feasible participation," though often justified on
these grounds, rarely involves more than a few representatives appointed or elected to
governing boards and neighborhood advisory committees of city-wide community action
agencies. Elections for such positions do not differ from those for other public offices,
except for even smaller turnout and occasional reverse means tests. see Comment, Participa-
tion of the Poor: Section 202(aX3) Organizations Under the Economic Opportunity Act of
1964, 75 YALE LJ. 599 (1966); Hayden, A View of the Poverty Program: "When It's Dry
you Can't Crack It With A Pick," New York University Center for the Study of Unem-
ployed Youth, 1966; Shostak, Containment, Co-optation, or Co-determination, AM. CuiLD,
Nov. 1965, at 15; Cloward, War on Poverty: Are the Poor Left Out?, 201 Tim NATIo.v
55 (1965); Cloward & Elman, The First Congress of the Poor, 202 TiE NATION 148 (1966;
M. Avery, Maximum Feasible Participation: A Case Study, April 1966 (unpublished senior
essay in Yale University Library).
42. See Rosenberg, Some Determinants of Political Apathy, 18 Pun. Opmr. Q. 349 (1954-
55), M. I.a,, THE ALENATED VOTER, ch. 4 & passim (1960) and Tim CoNPL.EAT PoLriczix
149-56 (1962); R. DAmr, WHO GovERxs? 286-93 (1961). Other studies are reviewed in Walker,
A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy, 60 A.M. Por. Se. Ray. 285 (1966); Campbell.
The Passive Citizen, in APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION (S. Rokkan
ed. 1962); L. MH.RATH, PoLrMcAL PARTICIPATION 56-59 (1965); R. L.AE, PouTrcAr Luz 147-
55 (1959).
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If this institutional explanation of political apathy is correct, many
people might well choose to take part in small neighborhood polities
since decision-making there would be comprehensible and accessible
and each person's activities could directly affect public actions. An ex-
periment in voluntary neighborhood self-government would test this
hypothesis and could substantially increase democracy, dignity, and
opportunity for social innovation.
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